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In the context of a large outbreak of Shiga toxin–
producing  Escherichia coli O104:H4 in Germany, we 
quantiﬁ  ed the timeliness of the German surveillance system 
for hemolytic uremic syndrome and Shiga toxin–producing 
E. coli notiﬁ   able diseases during 2003–2011. Although 
reporting occurred faster than required by law, potential for 
improvement exists at all levels of the information chain.
I
n May and June 2011, Germany experienced the 
largest outbreak of hemolytic uremic syndrome (HUS) 
and bloody diarrhea related to Shiga toxin–producing 
Escherichia coli (STEC) ever reported (1,2). As of June 20, 
a total of 2,518 STEC cases and 786 HUS cases meeting 
the case deﬁ   nitions for this outbreak were reported to 
the national agency for infectious disease epidemiology 
(Robert Koch Institute [RKI]) through the surveillance 
system in Germany for notiﬁ  able diseases (GSSND) (3). 
The ﬁ  rst outbreak-associated case-patient fell ill on May 1, 
followed by a sharp increase in the number of HUS case-
patients on May 9 (by onset of symptom). Case numbers by 
disease onset peaked around May 22. Epidemiologic and 
food trace-back investigations identiﬁ  ed fenugreek sprouts, 
grown from seeds probably contaminated by STEC, at a 
farm in Lower Saxony to be the vehicle of the outbreak (4). 
From June 10 on, German authorities recommended that 
raw sprouts should not be eaten.
In the GSSND, heads of laboratories have to send 
notiﬁ   cation of STEC cases, and clinicians are legally 
mandated to report HUS cases within 24 hours to the local 
health department by fax, telephone, or letter (5). Legally, 
reporting of these cases from the local health department 
through the state health department to RKI must be 
completed within 16 days. To minimize the reporting 
delay, beginning May 23, the local health departments 
and state health departments agreed to report cases every 
working day (6).
On May 18, the ﬁ   rst outbreak-associated case 
(patient’s onset of diarrhea was May 2) was reported to 
RKI. On the same day, a local hospital notiﬁ  ed the local 
health department of Hamburg North about a cluster of 
HUS in 3 children. RKI was alerted to the outbreak cluster 
on May 19 by email.
Given the extent of the outbreak, questions arose 
about the timeliness of the GSSND regarding STEC and 
HUS cases. We assessed intervals between notifying and 
reporting STEC and HUS cases from January 1, 2003, 
through June 22, 2011, to identify potential needs and 
strategies for improvement.
The Study
We divided the analysis into 3 periods: period A (before 
the outbreak) was from January 1, 2003, through April 30, 
2011; period B (early phase of the outbreak) was from May 
1 (when the ﬁ  rst outbreak-associated case-patient fell ill) 
through May 18 (date when the HUS cluster was detected); 
and period C (late phase of the outbreak) was from May 19 
through June 22. Data on timeline events for all reported 
STEC and HUS cases were collected from the GSSND (7). 
Timeline events comprised the following dates: symptom 
onset (onset of diarrhea), diagnosis, notiﬁ  cation (date when 
the notiﬁ  cation arrived at the local health department), and 
reporting (date when the report arrived at RKI). Dates of 
symptom onset and diagnosis were excluded when they 
were after the date of notiﬁ  cation. For each case, intervals 
between timeline events were calculated from the dates 
available. Intervals were then assigned to 1 of the 3 periods 
(A, B, or C) according to the ﬁ  rst date of the interval. Median 
times and interquartile ranges (IQR) were calculated in 
days for each type of interval for each period. Statistical 
analyses were done by using Stata software version 11.0 
(StataCorp LP, College Station, TX, USA).
For the 1,394 HUS cases with available information, 
the median times from symptom onset in patients to 
diagnosis and to notiﬁ  cation were similar in periods A and 
B (8 days and 9–10 days, respectively) and shorter in period 
C (4 and 5 days, respectively) (Table 1). The median time 
from symptom onset to reporting decreased from 20 days in 
period A to 12 and 8 days in periods B and C, respectively. 
The median time from diagnosis to notiﬁ  cation was longer 
in period B (4.5 days) than in periods A and C (1 and 0 
day, respectively). Among the 14 HUS cases with available 
information for period B, 10 (71%) were notiﬁ  ed after 24 
hours. The interval from notiﬁ  cation of the local health 
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department to report to RKI was longer in periods A and 
B than in period C (7 and 8 days vs. 3 days, respectively). 
For the 13,400 STEC cases with available information, we 
noticed in period B a longer delay from symptom onset in 
patients to reporting (15 days vs. 12 days for HUS) but a 
shorter delay from diagnosis to notiﬁ  cation (2 days vs. 4.5 
days for HUS) (Table 2). The Figure shows the increasing 
numbers of patients with disease onset on May 9, diagnosis 
and notiﬁ  cation on May 18, and reporting on May 24.
Conclusions
A median of 11 days passed between onset of 
symptoms and notiﬁ  cation of STEC cases in period A. A 
study by Hedberg et al. in 6 US states reported a delay of 
7 days for the same interval for E. coli O157 infections 
(8). Considering that period B is biased for the interval 
“onset of symptom to reporting,” because the second 
date of the interval is likely to be in period C when the 
reporting  ﬂ  ow was accelerated, we could only consider 
period A for this interval. We found that a median of 20 
days occurred between symptom onset and reporting for 
STEC and HUS cases. This result is comparable to the 18 
days reported for foodborne infections in the Netherlands 
(9). However, the duration between symptom onset and 
reporting can be reduced to 8 days, as was seen in period C. 
We also found that most of the HUS cases in period B were 
notiﬁ  ed later than mandated by law. Although the number 
of cases was small, this is a remarkable result. It might be 
explained by the limited experience of nephrologists in 
notifying adult HUS cases. However, this also shows the 
need to motivate and to assist clinicians to notify within 
24 hours (e.g., with an automatic electronic notiﬁ  cation 
tool that could alert clinicians of their obligation to notify 
the disease when entering the diagnosis of HUS). By 
looking only at the timeline events directly under control 
of public health authorities, we found that the interval from 
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Table 1. Median reporting intervals, in days, for 1,394 hemolytic uremic syndrome cases in 3 periods, Germany* 
Interval†
Period A  Period B  Period C 
Total no./N‡ (%)  No./N‡ (%)  Med (IQR) No./N‡ (%)  Med (IQR)  No./N‡ (%)  Med (IQR)
From symptom onset to  1,267/1,394§ (91)
  Diagnosis 283/497 (57)  8 (4–12)  136/237 (57)  8 (6–9)  331/533 (62)  4 (2–6)  750/1,267 (59) 
  Notification to LHD 312/497 (63)  10 (6–15)  173/237 (73)  9 (7–10)  396/533 (74)  5 (3–7)  881/1,267 (70) 
 Report  to  RKI 497/497 (100)  20 (14–26) 237/237 (100)  12 (9–15)  533/533 (100)  8 (6–11)  1,267/1,267 (100)
From diagnosis to  798/1,394§ (57) 
  Notification to LHD 264/294 (90)  1 (0–3)  14/15 (93)  4.5 (1–7)  473/489 (97)  0 (0–1)  751/798 (94) 
 Report  to  RKI 294/294 (100)  10 (7–16)  15/15 (100)  8 (8–9)  489/489 (100)  3 (2–6)  798/798 (100) 
From notification to LDH to  943/1,394§ (68) 
  Report to RKI 319/319 (100)  7 (5–13)  6/6 (100)  8 (6–8)  618/618 (100)  3 (1–5)  943/943 (100) 
*Period A, 2003 Jan 1–2011 Apr 30; Period B, 2011 May 1–2011 May 18; Period C, 2011 May 19–2011 Jun 22; med, median; IQR, interquartile range; 
LHD, local health department; RKI, Robert Koch Institute. 
†Classification of the interval in 1 of the 3 periods according to the first date of this interval. 
‡No./N, no. patients having available data for both dates of the interval/no. patients having available data for the first date of the interval. 
§No. patients having available data for this date/total no. hemolytic uremic syndrome cases. 
Table 2. Median reporting intervals, in days, for 13,400 Shiga toxin–producing Escherichia coli cases in 3 periods, Germany* 
Interval†
Period A  Period B  Period C 
Total no./N‡ (%)  No./N‡ (%)  Med (IQR) No./N‡ (%)  Med (IQR) No./N‡ (%)  Med (IQR)
From symptom onset to  9,365/13,400§ (70) 
 Diagnosis 4,734/6,700
(71) 
8 (5–16)  368/494
(74) 
9 (6–13)  1,606/2,171
(74) 
4 (3–6)  6,708/9,365 (72) 
  Notification to LHD 4,652/6,700
(69) 
11 (7–18)  423/494
(86) 
10 (7–15)  1,848/2,171
(85) 
5 (3–7)  6,923/9,365 (74) 
 Report  to  RKI 6,700/6,700
(100) 
20 (14–30) 494/494
(100) 
15 (11–20) 2,171/2,171
(100) 
9 (6–12)  9,365/9,365 (100) 
From diagnosis to  9,261/13,400§ (69) 
  Notification to LHD 6,088/6,802
(90) 
1 (0–3)  69/70  
(99) 
2 (0–6)  2,353/2,389
(98) 
0 (0–1)  8,510/9,261 (92) 
 Report  to  RKI 6,802/6,802
(100) 
9 (6–14)  70/70  
(100) 
9.5 (7–13) 2,389/2,389
(100) 
4 (2–6)  9,261/9,261 (100) 
From notification to LDH to  9,529/13,400§ (71) 
 Report  to  RKI 6,712/6,712
(100) 
7 (4–11)  50/50  
(100) 
8 (6–11)  2,767/2,767
(100) 
3 (1–5)  9,529/9,529 (100) 
*Period A, 2003 Jan 1–2011 Apr 30; Period B, 2011 May 1–2011 May 18; Period C, 2011 May 19–2011 Jun 22; med, median; IQR, interquartile range; 
LHD, local health department; RKI, Robert Koch Institute. 
†Classification of the interval in 1 of the 3 periods according to the first date of this interval. 
‡No./N, no. patients having available data for both dates of the interval/no. patients having available data for the first date of the interval. 
§No. patients having available data for this date/total number of Shiga toxin–producing Escherichia coli cases. notiﬁ  cation of the local health department to reporting to 
RKI could be shortened from 1 week to 3 days if the local 
health department and the state health department routinely 
transmitted data on a daily basis.
This outbreak is a good example of circumstances in 
which single cases occur initially in multiple local health 
administrations in different federal states. In such situations, 
early outbreak detection and investigation become crucial 
to ensure early and continuous reporting to authorities at 
the national level. Given the current delays in diagnosis, 
notiﬁ  cation, and reporting, this outbreak would have been 
detected at the national level considerably later than May 
19 if the Hamburg health department had not promptly 
contacted RKI. This illustrates that state health departments 
and RKI need to receive local notiﬁ   cations earlier to 
successfully apply detection algorithms that would indicate 
potential multicounty or multistate outbreaks (10).
A revision of the notiﬁ  cation and reporting system 
should be considered in Germany, with the goal of timely 
detection of increases in infectious diseases while being 
sustainable and speciﬁ   c. This result could be achieved 
if physicians and heads of laboratories could feed their 
data into a centralized database shared by local health 
departments, state health departments, and RKI with 
different access rights.
Acknowledgments
This study would not have been possible without the support 
and participation of all physicians and laboratories as well as 
the staff from the local and state health departments, whose 
investigations and notiﬁ  cations were the data basis of this report.
This project was funded by the Robert Koch Institute.
DISPATCHES
1908  Emerging Infectious Diseases • www.cdc.gov/eid • Vol. 17, No. 10, October 2011
Figure. Hemolytic uremic syndrome (HUS) cases by date of symptom onset (A), date of diagnosis (B), date of notiﬁ  cation (C) (i.e., the date 
that the local health department was notiﬁ  ed of the case), and date of reporting (D) (i.e., the date that the Robert Koch Institute received 
the report of the case from the local health department) during outbreak of Shiga toxin–producing Escherichia coli infection and HUS, 
May–June 2011, Germany. Vertical lines indicate May 19, when the Robert Koch Institute received reports about a cluster of HUS cases 
in children. Dark gray bars represent outbreak-related cases; white bars represent cases not related to the outbreak. Only cases with 
available information are represented.Timeliness of Surveillance for E. coli
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